Abstract. This paper revisits the aggregation theorem of Chichilnisky (1980), replacing the original smooth topology by the closed convergence topology and responding to several comments (N. Baigent (1984Baigent ( , 1985Baigent ( , 1987Baigent ( , 1989, N. Baigent and P. Huang (1990) and M. LeBreton and J. Uriarte (1990a, b). Theorems 1 and 2 establish the contractibility of three spaces of preferences: the space of strictly quasiconcave preferences Psco, its subspace of smooth preferences psSco, and a space P1 of smooth (not necessarily convex) preferences with a unique interior critical point (a maximum). The results are proven using both the closed convergence topology and the smooth topology. Because of their contractibility, these spaces satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) for aggregation rules satisfying my axioms, which are valid in all topologies. Theorem 4 constructs a family of aggregation rules satisfying my axioms for these three spaces. What these spaces have in common is a unique maximum (or peak). This rather special property makes them contractible, and thus amenable to aggregation. However, these aggregation rules cannot be extended to the whole space of preferences P which is not contractible and therefore does not admit continuous aggregation rules satisfying anonymity and unanimity, Chichilnisky (1980Chichilnisky ( , 1982. The results presented here clarify an erroneous example in LeBreton and Uriarte (1990a, b) and respond to Baigent (1984Baigent ( , 1985Baigent ( , 1987 and Baigent and Huang (1990) on the relative advantages of continuous and discrete approaches to Social Choice.
Introduction
Recent papers by Baigent and Huang (1990) and Baigent (1984 Baigent ( , 1985 Baigent ( , 1987 , LeBreton and Uriarte (1990a, b) , make interesting comments on some of my theorems in Social choice and on other results following my approach. Baigent and * Comments from Geoffrey M. Heal, Andreu Mas Colell, Jean Francois Mertens and Maurice Salles are gratefully acknowledged. Research support was provided by NSF SES 8409857. G. Chichilnisky Huang (1990) and Baigent (1985 Baigent ( , 1987 reinterpret my results in a discrete framework, and argue in favor of the discrete approach as preferable to the formulation of Social Choice problems in a continuous fashion. I argue here that both approaches are useful, but the continuous approach seems necessary to obtain certain fundamental results, such as necessary and sufficient conditions for resolving the social choice paradox (Chichilnisky and Heal 1983) , results which could not be obtained in a discrete framework. In addition, a continuous approach allows the use of calculus and topology and thus helps bridge the gap between social choice and the theory of markets, e.g. Chichilnisky (1990b) . This cannot be achieved with the discrete approach. LeBreton and Uriarte (1990a, b) argue in favour my topological approach but attempt to test the robustness of my results by changing the topology to the closed convergence topology and claiming to construct a counterexample. This they attempt to do by constructing an aggregation map which satisfies my axioms on a space of strictly quasiconcave preferences denoted Psco, a space which they claim "is identified with" a sphere (page 5, line 8), while my theorem proves that spheres do not admit such aggregation maps (Chichilnisky 1982) . Their argument is flawed because of a topological miscalculation: their claim that Psco is a sphere is incorrect. Theorem 1 establishes that Psco is a contractible space, both in the closed convergence and (its smooth version psSco) in the smooth topologies. Because of its contractibility, Psco cannot be identified with a sphere. Contractibility is also why Psco admits aggregation maps respecting my axioms: this is the result proved in Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) . Their example is therefore a corollary of the Chichilnisky-Heal 1983 theorem, thus showing the robustness of our results when the topology is changed and the closed convergence topology is adopted. Theorems 1 and 2 establish the contractibility of Psco by constructing a deformation retract of Psco into a space of one-peaked preferences which is, in turn, homeomorphic to the choice space X. Since the choice space X is convex, Psco is contractible, and definitely not a sphere. Theorem 2 establishes the same result for the space of smooth preferences in Psco, denoted psSco, and also for a space P1 of n o n c o n v e x smooth preferences with a unique maximum. All these spaces have one thing in common: they have a unique interior critical point, a maximum, on X (also called one peak). This special property makes them contractible, and amenable to social aggregation 1. Theorem 4 constructs (always within the space of one peaked preferences) a large family of convex-type aggregation map respecting unanimity and anonymity and continuous under both topologies, for Psco, psSco and P1. These maps are different from the maps proposed by LeBreton and Uriarte, because the latter are not well defined on smooth preferences. The existence of such convex-like aggregation maps exhibits clearly the special structure of the space of preferences Psco, and explains its restricted nature. In contractible spaces there is no difficulty in finding appropriate aggregation maps: this is the result in Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) , which is true for any topology. The problem emerges when trying to construct appropriate aggregation maps for the whole space of preferences, which is not contractible. The space of all preferences does not admit aggregation maps satisfying my axioms (Chichilnisky 1980) , nor do LeBreton and Uriarte attempt to construct one. Therefore, their work does not really deal with the robustness of my impossibility results; it simply shows that
